Israeli and Palestinian Political Reflections on the Moment and on the Future

On March 28th, Mishkan Chicago cohosted a dialogue on the war in Gaza and Israel, together with IPF Atid Chicago and New Israel Fund. Rabbi Lizzi moderated the discussion which featured Agora Initiative co-founder Khalil Sayegh and IPF Atid director Shanie Reichman.

IPF Atid
https://israelpolicyforum.org/atid/

Agora Initiative
www.theagorainitiative.org

NIF
https://www.nif.org/

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Produced by Mishkan Chicago. Music composed, produced, and performed by Kalman Strauss.

Transcript

Transcript

Hi, everybody. Welcome to Mishkan, it is very nice to see many faces who have been in this space many times before. And also many of you who for whom it is your first time in our space. And we're so happy to have you here. We're really happy to be partnering with Israel policy forum, a teed and also the new Israel fund to do this event tonight. And so glad that Khalil and SHINee, could be here to have this conversation with us. So I want to say a few words about the organizations that are partnering to do this. A few words about our presenters, and then a few words about how we will have this conversation and this learning. So first of all, for whom is it your first time at a at a Mishkan thing or in our space? Hi, welcome. It is very nice to see you and I'm happy you're here. Mishkan is a post denominational Jewish spiritual community. So that means that we kind of dark out or no reform conservative, not really Orthodox, let's be honest. But I don't know Reconstructionist renewal all of the above none of the above. We take influences from from all of the all of the great Jewish spiritual traditions and are claimed by none of them. But I myself was ordained in the conservative movement. And our people come from all over the place and identify as all kinds of things in the Jewish space, which makes things interesting. And the new Israel Fund is a grant making organization that is working to make Israel a more equal and democratic society. And then finally, and many of you are here because of your connection with IPF or IPF puttied. The Israel Policy Forum is dedicated to advancing the goal of a two state outcome to preserve Israel's future as a secure democratic and Jewish state. And IPF T is the young professional led community to engage and empower the next generation of leaders to build a more resilient community elevate the discourse and advance a two state solution in Israel. Okay, about our presenters. So Shani Reisman is the IPF, a teed national director at Israel Policy Forum, based in New York City, where she works to elevate the discourse around the Israeli Palestinian conflict. She serves as the founding co chair of forum Devora for the forum Devora. US committee is on the board of Queens College Hillel on the Advisory Council for the Center for ethnic, racial and religious understanding as the deputy communications director for the young professionals in foreign policy, New York chapter and is a mentor with girls security. All of those sounds really interesting, and we're probably not going to hear about most of those things tonight, but I suppose if you're interested after the panel, you can talk with me about them. And am I pronouncing your name correctly? Khalil. Okay, is a political analyst focused on Palestinian politics and the Israeli Palestinian conflict. He is also the co founder and president of the Agora initiative. Khalil lived most of his life in Gaza and the West Bank, where he was involved in political activism and humanitarian initiatives. Khalil is lived experience in addition to his academic and professional experience shaped his knowledge of the region. Hollywood's writing is featured in several outlets, including AI monitor the new era, but the economist and the Wall Street Journal, he's regularly on TV to offer analyses including BBC ABC, Australia AlJazeera. And if you looked him up on x, and you've probably seen, you know, many of his thoughts on the issue is, he holds a master's degree in political science from American University and lives in Washington DC. And what I want to say is before we begin tonight, or rather, by way of beginning, I worked on some questions with Sinead last week. She's She and Khalil regularly talk in front of groups. So this is not like a point counterpoint. This is more of a discussion between people who sometimes see things similarly and sometimes see things differently. And this is not meant to be in any way like a point counterpoint or debate style, style thing. And also not between like us as an audience, or, and the panelists. And my guess is from all of the different walks of life that we come from even including, I feel like the back row filled in very quickly with IVF people who all know each other from other places. And even among the people who all know each other from a particular context like for example IPF or Anya or Mishkan. You know, that, even within you know, communities, we don't all agree on things. And so what I always say to people is when walking into a room, you never assume anything about anybody, any anything about anybody's background or beliefs. And that rather than listening for the purpose of agreeing very often, just because of how our brains are designed, we listen for agreement, we read for agreements, and we like things that conform to things that we already believe and agree with. But actually, my guess is you came here tonight to learn and grow and even possibly be made uncomfortable for the purpose of understanding. And so I want to invite us tonight to have wide open minds to be open to hearing and learning and growing. And in those moments, when you may hear something with which you do not agree, rather than formulating the response in your head, that will become the question that you will raise your hand and ask at the end, which so often happens at these things, you know, what I'm talking about? My invitation to all of us, is that we lean in for deeper understanding. So the question becomes more of like, I wonder how they arrived at that viewpoint? I wonder what led to, you know, them seeing things the way they do? Because at the end of the day, we know, we're not actually here, none of us are here to change anyone's mind. We're here to learn, and because you already know what you think. So that is just to say, I'm excited for whatever conversation we will have. And this is very much a conversation. I'll start by asking them questions, and then we will open it up for q&a. And when we get there, you know, we'll we'll talk about how that'll work. So hollyland Shini, I would love I'm gonna, I'm gonna sit down and I'm gonna hand the mic to hear. I would love to get a sense from you about how we got to where we are right now. Generally speaking, and then certainly since October seventh. Just one last thing on board about what the board initiative does. Yeah.

No, I mean, like I said, I mean, we promote constitutional democracy in the Middle East started from Israel, Palestine. So we basically trying to solve as rapidly as the first step, but then the broader thing is that we believe that this will promote constitutional democratic values, and it's me, and my co founders and straight American legal scholar was always

extremely important stuff. Quite everybody here. HollyWell No, okay. So either you need to speak closer to the mic or I need to turn you know, I will take this Oh, wonderful. You got it. Okay.

Okay, your piece at the end again, it's important people know. So I think the Where did we start question, not just in this work in the Israeli Palestinian conflict in general is a very interesting question. Because when I speak to Palestinians, a lot of them started around 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, definitely 1947 1948 with, you know, what I see is the War of Independence and they see as the Nakba catastrophe. And when you talk to Israelis, they could start with the Bible, you know. And when you talk about this war in particular, usually they're starting it with October 7, they might start with 2007. And that's where I'm going to start recognizing that other people have a different start date. And all those start dates have pretty good reasons for being start dates do. So with when, when Hamas sort of violently took over the Gaza Strip. And then there was an Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip and Hamas ended up sort of governing this strip since 2007, which is quite a long time. believe you'll correct me if I'm wrong that about half of Gazans have were born after Hamas took over. Right, which is to say, a generation raised by Hamas in many ways, or at least under their leadership, which is quite authoritarian. And the cycle of violence has been ongoing. Not since then, again, there's been a cycle of violence for a very long time, but the Gaza Israel cycle of violence in the sense that Hamas is still sending rockets to Israel, and I won't I won't push for who started at first narrative, either, again, recognizing that mine is different from from others, but essentially rockets going into Israel. On and on until, you know, there is a decision of it from on the Israeli side, are we going to actually go in and conduct an operation and every few years? The answer is, yes. It's an operation when people die, particularly Gazans also IDF soldiers. Egypt, at some point will broker a ceasefire, generally speaking, which will quiet for a bit of time, but then it goes on and on I maybe six rounds at this point. It's been quite a lot. And then on October 7, everybody, I don't mean to tell people here what happened on October 7. And I think that in some ways that broke the cycle of violence, because it shook people to their core, and they think there is certainly all speak for the Israeli side and unwillingness to return to that cycle, and a feeling of desperation that there's a need to break it in some way and not return to it. I don't know that we can We'll speak more on what that might look like, and if it's going to work. But that's that's definitely the perception.

Yeah, I think like when we think of where we how we got here, I think I can think of two way those two things a the Palestinians are in conflict, and the fact that hasn't been solved in 75 years, you know, it started with ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. Palestinians became refugees in Gaza, and those back and other places, things were really horrific for the Palestinians, even before 67. Before the work was what we defined legally to the last occupation. Things were never addressed, the weaknesses of the Crusades were never addressed. And then 67 happened, the Palestinians, we came under direct occupation of, of the Israeli state. And then fast forward, we have the Oslo agreement, some sort of hope, and that peace will come and it's very close, etc. Yet it failed. And since the Oslo Agreement, or I mean, one can say even since the homework plan in 2007, or eight, there were no any serious plan on the Israeli side to end occupation. We only have got more and more hardcore Israeli Government delighted with Palestinian fundamental rights, denial of Palestinians, right to statehood. And we have got the most radical right wing Israeli government, the history of Israel, right now led by Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu. In the last couple of years, we've seen I mean, at least here, we've seen this government not only denying the Palestinian statehood, and taking every step it can to make the annexation of the West Bank, a de facto, although there is no official organization, but I do believe there is a de facto an extradition within the West Bank to make it legalized, but also to deny the very existence of the Palestinian people. So all that in the context. 2023 prior to October 7, was already the deadliest year on the Palestinians and almost like over 230 Palestinians in the West Bank have been killed. So that is the context of what what is the context we're targeting. Now, when I say context, usually, people assume that I've just defined what a strategy is or crime Hamas has committed October 7, I mean, by no means I do justify that, obviously. I mean, in particular, those war crimes that are committed against the civilians cannot be justified what sort of legally or morally, however, that's the context of the of the of the, of what what happened after so that's one thing the other thing is what what she was talking about is that Tamas being empowered since two doses Something which I think was a mistake. I think not only this is a mistake that they made at least Benjamin Netanyahu funded Hamas a lot for the automatic central not only this mistake also on the Palestinian side, I think the Palestinian Authority in 2007 did a mistake. Although the mistake was technical in the sense that we don't want to go to civil war with Hamas, does they withdraw from Gaza? People say, Oh, Hamas, one Obatala does. The PA says exactly that, I think that the Palestinians decided not to shoot, so we don't kill our own people. And I think partially it was a mistake, because Hamas was able to radicalize a certain segment of the Palestinian society that to take us to places where we are being used for interest of other countries. I think that's the second thing is that Hamas has been in power for the last 10 years. And the unfortunate reality is at the same time with Hamas became more and more powerful because of Israeli policies, the Israeli policies, made sure that fatter, and the other alternative to Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, is becoming weaker and weaker. And that's I think both of these things goes and barako together, not contradicting. And that's how we got to this very dire situation that we have right now.

So this question wasn't on our list, but it just occurs to me. So first of all, Polylang is a very brave thing, that you come into Jewish spaces all the time and speak to Jewish groups. And I really don't want this group to take that for granted. How? I mean, I don't I don't know if I don't know, nobody here looks scary. But like, I could imagine that it's that it's intimidating to come and speak to a Jewish group. Or maybe you're so used to it by this point, that it's not, but I think, for, for, for me, it's actually a very rare thing to get to speak to somebody who grew up in Gaza. And I wonder, first of all, if you would be willing to share a little bit about your own background in history that brought you to the place where you wanted to study with this conflict academically. That and for you, this is not academic. This is the place where you grew up. And, and chinny I feel like you could address the same thing as an Israeli American. But yeah, sure.

Yeah. I mean, can you speak a little? Sure. Is that better? Yeah. I mean, the first part is like was making Jewish spaces. So no, that's not

to say thank you. Thank you for

the question. Yeah. I mean, I was born in Gaza to refugee family myself. So my entire life was shaped by the conflict when I was born in 1994. Actually, so the year right after Rasul, it's actually the year when the Palestinian Authority has entered Gaza. And when I became aware to this to this word at the age of six, it was when the when the Second Intifada, sir. So my first memory of the conflict is the Israeli only captors bombing. The residential house of President I refer to wasn't really far from where I left. So all that shaped my, my thinking how I feel about it, then I lived through the hostile takeover of Gaza, then after this, after the first war 2008, on Gaza. It was brutal. And I've seen, you know, hundreds of people dying from the virus from the airstrikes, I decided to move to the West Bank, move to the West Bank. And I actually always like politics always wanted to be involved in thinking about politics, not only about the Israeli Palestinian issue, but there was actually more interesting on the question of, you know, democratization in the region. And that's what I did in my research for my masters, etc. But, you know, a mentor of mine actually suggested that we should, but stability is because it's not pure. And I went to the most pure subject was theology to to be as accurate as possible. I got my bachelor in theology, and then I realized I'm not pure enough to, to continue the theology and say, Well, I think I go into politics. I want to study I came to DC to study at American

so I, I, my grandparents are more part of the sort of science underground in Iran in the 40s. They were part of my grandfather in particular was was part of the movement smuggling Iraqi Jewish children into the Palestine in the wake of the farhood, which was sort of a series of programs in Iraq. And so I was raised on these these tales. My grandfather ended up on death row in Iran. Eventually my grandparents made it to Israel, but this was sort of my is my faith how I see my family history is being a part of that and they went and fought in in 1948. My grandfather didn't my grandma was a few years younger and and of course, maybe it's Israel and I was was raised on this Zionist mythologies which are still very much deeply part of me and something I'm brought up in many ways. I grew up in New York, but spend several months a year in Jerusalem, which is a deeply complicated city that I was completely unaware of, almost entirely. I had, I ended up working very closely with, with the Obeah from East Jerusalem, which was my first sort of realization that there even was an Israeli Palestinian conflict, frankly, and, and eventually started to embark on my own journey of, of learning, which my family was very supportive of. And I had a lot of fun argument with my grandfather, for many, many years, if you know, the politics of Middle Eastern Jews in Israel, particularly different from my own this point, and so I spent sort of a lot of time in conversation and dialogue with my grandparents and my family members in a really meaningful way. And I wanted to bring that everywhere else, because I felt that I straddled the lines across many communities religiously, as well, I grew up in an Orthodox community, but also lived between reformative conservative and post denomination spaces, and lives across like Ashkenazi and Misaki. communities as well. And so I felt like it was important to bring communities together and have hard, really hard, painful conversations about the Israeli Palestinian conflict, even when it feels completely impossible and heart wrenching. And so that's why I do this work.

This is gonna be really frustrating for Shinae because we spent like an hour on the phone, designing questions. And now I have a whole new set of questions. But I hope that I hope this will make them more interesting than you know, just your standard thing. Um, you a moment ago, you mentioned growing up on Zionist mythologies, some of which, you know, really are still part of who you are. I wonder if both of you could speak to the mythologies that shaped your childhood, which you now realize are myths, and that you needed to unlearn or relearn or learn better or deeper or differently as adults to help you kind of, to the, you know, mature to the next stage or think to the next solution that the mythology wasn't able to give. I, I

think most of the mythologies I was raised with are true. I just think there are other mythologies that are also true at the same time. So I don't think that the night that I still see the 1948 word as the word independence to me, I know that's not what it is for Palestinians. And I don't, I don't think they should see it that way. But it doesn't mean that I don't see it that way anymore. I just recognize that there are other truths at the same time, I still see my grandfather as having been extremely brave and heroic and, and frankly, saving, saving the lives of his own people in many ways that, again, it's not how Palestinians see it, and it isn't how they shouldn't see it that way either. And their experience as a result of it is true at the same time. And so I don't see myself as unlearning, I see myself adding additional learnings. I suppose the piece that I do think is unlearning. And I will emphasize this actually didn't learn it all for my family. It was more like broader community institutions. I felt that I. And again, it didn't mean this wasn't at all true, but some of it is true. But the misperception that sort of all Polit Palestinians sort of mindlessly robotically hate Jews, all Jews is a problem. It doesn't mean there isn't anti semitism in Palestinian society, there isn't and it is a problem. But to view that as sort of the broad swath of society is not only incorrect, not only sort of demonizing, but also doesn't really achieve any meaningful goals other than fear and mistrust and hatred and the sort of things that lead us to where we are today. So I think, to me, that's the piece that required on learning the most. But I didn't, I wasn't really raised in a home where people were so hateful, so I didn't really bite into it too much. But I think that's the piece that's most important to be overcoming when it comes to this issue.

Yeah, I don't know how much we followed. You have I've had really, I mean, maybe because I've got a bad memory maybe because I've been liberal for so long that I really don't adhere to a lot of mythology, but I'm sure I have some because every national movement, asset and mythology, but I think certain myths are not mythology, in the sense that things you believe about the other because you just make some sort of brightnesses and stuff that you've inherited from the collective memory of your people that I think have learned. And one of the men thinks that to me was really eye opening. I guess that to think usually, I mean, when you think and the Palestinian history you think of Israel and the context of colonialism and settler colonialism these two words are mostly used over a settler colonial thing is a new thing usually to talk about it in terms of imperialism and colonialism only the settler colonial literature is more developed right now, if you think of it in terms of colonialism and imperialism, that to me, as a kid, I always thought that means the implication is that every individual who was on the other side came here for colonial or imperial interest that they are then in themselves thinking in these terms, I think that was a myth. It's not true. I mean, obviously, people can for all sorts of reasons, some for religious reasons, some for you know, as a refugees of the Holocaust, etc. And I think this, this myth has been destroyed to me, not in the sense that I still do not see the institutions as colonial I do, to be honest. But I do see on the individual level that it's different. And I think there was used to be a tradition of people being able to separate between the institution and the individuals. But unfortunately, today's conversation doesn't really exist anymore. I don't see people at least open these terms out. That's something.

Yeah, I'm sorry, we should have three microphones here, we usually

share with between three. So

I think what you just said is very interesting. And I kind of want to come back to it the whole idea of the ability for people to decouple or detangle institutions, from people, you know, and to detangle Palestinians from the PA or from the mass and Israelis from Netanyahu or whoever's in the government, and the structures of the state versus the people who elect them, or don't elect them, and are just sort of their victims. And how well or poorly, we are all doing that right now. I just kind of want to I'll put that on the side and just observe that that was a thing that you said that I'm chewing on. So back to our questions here. How do you feel about the different objectives of this war, sort of the stated objectives of this war? How do you feel like they're being balanced? And some of those objectives right are like dismantling Hamas or dismantling Hamas is ability to be violent, rescuing hostages? How do you how do you see those goals as being balanced with the preservation of civilian life in Gaza? And also, to what extent do you think these goals are realistic or feasible?

Yeah, yeah, that's an easy question. I see how to start I mean, to start with, okay, civilians life and historical record for them. I unfortunately, don't see Israel as having regard to any civilians life. I mean, in the last two months, things have improved in the sense that this records this civilians, I guess we should be thankful for that recently. Um, not really, because it's still that the rate is high. But on the first two months, especially in the operation in the north, and in Honduras, it was literally massacre after massacre, baby. I mean, there's a reason why the three hostages were killed when they tried to escape, although they had white flats, because there's a policy and the Israeli army in that area when my family was in the same region, by the way, and say, to never have where the hostages were killed, with everyone who moves, even if they had white flag would be killed. And I know at least three elder woman from from our church community in Gaza were shot as they tried to go to the restroom. So yeah, I don't think Israel did have any plan or any intention to protect civilians life. There's also a policy you can learn about also the what's it called Power targets, where it's literally just targeted houses for because they look like a bar, not they look like to make them or horses, it's just to bring about terror and bring about fear. So to achieve certain deterrence, etc. Now on uprooting Hamas or dismantling Hamas, the ultimate problem with with this goal for Israel is that they never define what they mean by it. I mean, they said, to prevent their government capabilities, and to dismantle the military power. Now these two things are achievable, and they can be done. But the only way you could do this is that you're replacing them with some and one would think that this would replace them with themself for a while and then they would bring about the Palestinian Authority or some force or whatever. But what this one has been doing is that they get them they wiped the area they destroyed the Create a chaos, they create lawlessness, and then do withdraw. And then the only power but capable of filling this vacuum is Hamas because they can re emerge quickly or gangs, I clicked that hammer that Israel tried to work with and they failed, as well. So that is not a goal that you could achieve while by doing this and Israel is unwilling to occupy in the sense of taking care of civilians needs, they are unwilling to provide the water and electricity and etc. They didn't want that. I mean, that's the reason why in first place, they want to someone that people are saying 30 to remain as it is endorsed by today. And language of the Palestinians. They want someone to bake their garbage basically, which is you know, to take care of the garbage, so aging cetera. Now on return of the hostages, the unfortunate reality, too, is that hostages were being killed. I mean, Israeli killed more hostages in this operation than this liberated deliberated two hostages. To my knowledge, there are over 20 hostages who were killed in Gaza. Besides the other three people who were martyred as the word running, there's also people from the airstrikes and etc. So it's an it's a dire, dire situation. I think that's what right, these are the third, three questions. But

I also feel from from the beginning, I think it was realistic, I think there was a clear it was a path wouldn't have been easy, but I think Israel had the capabilities to successfully in some way, whatever their vision was dismantle Hamas militarily and from the governance structure, but I agree with Julio, it requires things that have not yet happened. And I think there is a closing window on when that can happen. Specifically, a strategy for the day after that includes an alternative to Hamas. I would say the Palestinian Authority, Israelis would say like a revitalized or Reformed Palestinian Authority short, I think there are a lot of things that need to be done there. But at least naming that out loud and recognizing that there is a clear plan, as opposed to the perception that maybe like a very an external adult state will come and manage an occupation of Gaza on behalf of the Israelis, which is the kind of thing that we hear. Right, and the kind of thing that probably won't be particularly successful. And so with regards to that A, yes, realistic, feasible, it'll require a lot. And I'll also add, I don't think there's with the current Israeli government, none of that will be necessarily possible, there's going to be no political will for inclusion of the Palestinian Authority, there's no that would serve immediately break the current government's, if there was talk of inclusion of the PA and in any way. And with regards to hostages in civilian life, i i to think that I'm somebody who generally is cautiously critical of the IDF, right? These are my friends, my family, too, I don't think it's evil people, I think there are good kinds people who are trying to do the right thing, oftentimes, and also very often falling short of that. And in this operation, falling very short of where I would feel comfortable, and what would make me proud. And I can excuse it by saying in the aftermath of October 7, you have traumatized reservists who have not been trained in a very long time. And it's a conscripted military and and I can give you a lot of excuses, and they're real, and they're true. And they're not good enough, because you're still a soldier, and you still have an obligation. And you're still a military, and you have obligations under international law. And so no excuse is good enough. For me, when it comes to this. One of my main concerns, which I might get to later is humanitarian aid, which, and again, this is something that is partially a political problem, because it's on the political elite to say, humanitarian aid for Gazans is not a gift to Hamas. If anything, if you've rewarding him, it gives us the ability to continue this war, because you cannot continue this war if everybody's starving in Gaza. Right. And so even I could, I could argue that there's a way to socialize it to the public, that would have been much more successful, as opposed to framing it as a gift to Hamas, which has become one of the tropes in Israeli society that's deeply problematic. And yes, I think hostages have taken have not been the primary goal. They've risen on the agenda list. But we see the deal on the table for Hamas, which is essentially, we will, we will return hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and a long term ceasefire. They want a permanent ceasefire, which is essentially hostages in exchange for ending the war permanently. And there isn't a willingness to do that. And I'm not let's not I don't think Israeli society necessarily broadly supports that either. But that's a clear choice. And again, as long as this war goes on every sort of day, that they are hostages in the Gaza Strip, their risk of dying could be by an airstrike could We've been shocked by the IETF. We now have unfortunately, you know, accidentally, obviously, or could be by Hamas certainly or whoever else. So I think that should be higher on the priority list. I will just add sorry to talk for so long, another war aim that isn't explicitly listed, but is important, which is that, whereas I might focus very narrowly on this as a war between Israel and Hamas, maybe Israel and Gaza, depending on how you see it. Israelis are seeing this as a war against all Iran's proxies, Hezbollah, the Houthis, in Yemen, etc. For good reason, in many ways, I don't think I think it's very reasonable. Those are very legitimate concerns. I just got back from Israel. And the concerns in the Northern Front are very real, very serious threat. But that means that there is another word, which is deterrence. And so all they are thinking every day is if we don't hit Hamas back hard enough, Hezbollah will attack us, and we will have skyscrapers being hit in Tel Aviv by Hezbollah's rockets. Because is, you know, for those of us who follow the conflict, the idea that rockets are going to like crash into Tel Aviv skyscraper sounds insane. This is what war with Lebanon looks with war with Hezbollah, sorry, not that it looks like. And so I think that's on top of everyone's mind since October, sort of. And I think that's certainly playing to the calculus, and Gazans are paying the price for that, of course.

Could you comment on

the leadership? Sort

of, I guess you could say, both failures, but also opportunities. That you see. I mean, I think it's most powerful when we critique our own leaders. And so you know, from, from your perspective, and also, from your perspective, HollyWell, of Palestinian leadership, that has led to this moment, that sort of failures and opportunities that have led to this moment, missed opportunities. But also, you know, what we're seeing in this moment, that's sort of like, gosh, it would have been nice to have seen this, but we haven't seen this, and we're probably not going to see this, but maybe wouldn't it be wonderful if we might, but, you know, to sort of reflect on that, from the perspectives from which you're coming. You're going to

do Palestinians, and I'll do Israeli, I'll get all these things that you have.

No, I'm not going to see the side. I mean, the leadership is really complicated, because you've got Hamas in Gaza. And then you've got the Palestinian Authority. And in the West Bengal, both of them are also divided within themselves into sub groups, within the bigger groups like the BA is doing, you know, you've got, you know, optimizing or hold up paths. And then you've got all these smaller groups within the Palestinian Authority. Disagree. Same on Hamas. There's also factions within Hamas. So I think the biggest, obviously, the Palestinian leadership ever allows men are legitimate leadership has been total failure. I mean, Obama's and husband did not have really any political program besides wanting to negotiate with the Israelis and begging them, please come negotiate with me, come, I want peace. And despite everything nice is doing for them. They're just looking at it and loving it. They're doing nothing for me, obviously, on the on the domestic front is very corrupt. It's very authoritarian he doesn't. He literally destroyed the political structure within the party. That has been very problematic. The Palestinians, the Palestinian government was changed today. But today, literally, we have a new government with all names that I don't know, actually, old technocrats that I never heard of before, actually. It's really a strange thing. I don't know what that means. I don't know if it's positive or negative. I mean, I personally, don't feel very encouraged by it. Because it's not with national consensus. It's still a mass and being the guy to be a bunch of guys with the American consultation, Europeans. And I think any really dictation from America or Europe, on the Palestinians lead to illegitimate government all the time. That's not good. That looks really bad on that, on the other hand, you've got Hamas. And obviously, I'm not a fan at all. Anyone had hummus, but particularly the leadership and of Hamas and Gaza who are leading this war before it is, in particular crazy, and we're talking about one die. Yes, Mr. Bush, really hardcore, ideological himself. He was the founder of the unmatched security of Iran as of Hamas in the 80s where literally his his entire mission was to kill Palestinian who he suspected are working with Israel like that. That's his claim to fame, killing spy sought for Israel in a very brutal way. So he's very psychologically unstable, very brutal himself. won the election within Hamas leadership became the political leader in Gaza. And he is the one bullet Uh, what happened on October 7? I know that there's huge disagreement between savoir and the leadership of Hamas of Qatar as well. In particular, the two who are more soft liners, let's say, the southern wetsuit and Helen Michelle, both of whom don't have as much power as before, you know, even honey years more honey is somewhere in the middle. And it's an interesting thing. But yeah, I mean, opportunity, think that opportunity to be a factory, United itself, and pray about a strong national camp that is capable of defeating Hamas once and for all. And I think that only can be done if a Muslim person has to leave. There is no question about that. I mean, most likely he will die. So we'll wait for us and see

if we have these guys hang on a really long time, because joke

is that his father lived 120 years he keeps. I hope it's not true. But eventually he'll die. He smokes a lot. Yeah. So I'm thinking loss of goodwill. I was like the nephew of Yasser Arafat to combat the Klan in UAE. And I think for any of them to hold any position in the leadership, they need the blessing of Marwan Barghouti, who's and Australian percent the most popular figure in Palestinian politics today, one who can win an election against anyone and, and Palestine single handed. If he himself not really spicy, seems unlikely, at least him endorsing someone from further ethical would boost his popularity in a way that is very, very credible.

Do you think that's likely to happen that he would do that?

Yeah, he's very close to us. A good one is very close to the one.

So I'll speak for the Israeli side. I don't know how far back to go. We'll just stick with Netanyahu if that works, because he's actually kind of almost as long as somehow. But yeah, more. Yeah, here. Yeah, it's a little younger, so we'll have to vote him out instead, which is increasingly likely we'll get to that at the end. Netanyahu has shifted a lot over the years, I wrote a post March, which was like not my grandfather's Likud party. I don't want to get into American domestic politics. But liquid was sort of a traditional conservative hawkish party, and it has changed a lot over the past 10 years to such that a lot of those, like Manasa vegan was the founder of the original party, for example, that his son was basically ousted from the party, right, for being kind of a traditionalist, it has become a lot more nationalist, a lot more ideological, and I think has is no longer sort of seen as an end again, like not to make the comparison of the Republican Party, but actually see this very similar in the sense that it's become a lot less of those, like traditional values that you saw at the onset, and a lot more like nationalistic and also very attached to the party leader. So that's in the aisle was the face of liquid, the liquid isn't as now liquid has nothing happened to me out. If he likes the people in it, they stay. And if he doesn't, they go. And that's been been sort of the even though it is, I mean, and they elect him, right, like the the voters elect him. But an illiquid party has also like a history and I found liquid the Anathem begging was, was the person who welcomes in Middle Eastern Jews. And that's why all Middle Eastern Jews in Israel vote for Benjamin Netanyahu to this day, because we have been begging, you know, in the 50s, welcome that men, as opposed to like Ashkenazi elite of the Labour Party, my party. So there is like a history there as well, in terms of Netanyahu support, but he's been in office for like an insanely long amount of time. And there's something there's something dangerous about that for an individual to be in power for so long leading a country and there's something dangerous for the public to, to view this person as the only Savior. And for a country like Israel that is, frankly, very reliant on international support is something very dangerous about being perceived as one of the same theater. And that's something that is increasingly common, right. And so I can sit here all day and say, Israel will not attend. Yeah. But he's been in charge for as long as like, for like half my life, right? So it doesn't mean very much to say that. And so it's, it's hard for people to not conflate the two and and rightfully so at this point. And so there's a lot of problems separate from his policies, just with having a leader for so long that we can see sort of all around the world. But But yes, I think this current government is compared to all I'll go as far as to say any previous Israeli government, this one is by far the most extreme, religiously, democratically, sort of in every way imaginable. A year ago, when nobody was thinking about the Israeli Palestinian conflict, he said to me, I'm always thinking about the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and I'm always yelling at people that it's going to blow up and we're warning about So in 2019, we wrote a report called The crisis in Gaza. So, without basically this, no, we didn't predict this, this, this is pretty this is worse than we thought, but, but it's been on my mind for a long time. In any case, there were obviously judicial reform protests, a lot of domestic concern within Israel, essentially. And when I think about how the leadership brought us here, it's the comfort level. So who mentioned this earlier, that like Netanyahu was particularly I would say, comfortable with how these, how the relationship was between Israel and the Palestinians, was comfortable with allowing Qatar to send his money to cash payments to Hamas, was comfortable with the PA as weak as it was, and not allowing them or I would say, should have been supporting them and to be legitimate alternative to Hamas, and it undermining them instead, again, with many critiques of the PAs doesn't doesn't matter still, like a necessary thing to do? If you want to have a viable future? So I think he's, he's unfit for it, like from a domestic I'm an Israeli citizen, like from just from an Israeli perspective, internally, I already have enough reasons to say like there's a leadership issue in Israel right now. And right now, there's a crisis within within our military draft and a whole host of things. But when it comes to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, you need a visionary leader. If we talk later about sort of optimistic visions, everything requires a leader that can socialize these ideas to the public. And, and build public support. Right. And I believe in sort of top down in that way, I think it takes, you know, there's only so many people who can go the seeds of peace camp and name, right and do Israeli Palestinian peace building, we need leaders who can actually tell their public, this is important. This is why it's important. This is how it's going to help us personally, it's going to support our national security, and build support for it. And I mean, no Israeli leader has really successfully done that yet, I think we're being did a pretty good job until he was assassinated. You're not always gonna get you're never gonna get the fringe. But But Netanyahu is not even trying. And I think we need a leader who's willing to really try and I haven't even mentioned this, but obviously right in Far Right extremists who dismiss Coalition who say terrible, racist things and holds some some pretty insane views. And, you know, I think a lot of us were not myself, but many were willing to excuse it. And then Israel went on, you know, was called to trial at the ICJ and these ministers are being quoted at an iCj trial, right. And so I think Israelis are starting to wake up and realize, actually, it doesn't matter. If you have people like this in your government, you can, you can pretend they don't have power, but they do and what they says what they say matters.

Okay, I'm glad you went to the UN. So I kind of, I want to, I want to invite in some of the, like, the hot button, conflict points, that people will scream at each other about or scream about each other, and not in each other's presence, because they won't even talk to people who won't use the same vocabulary, who don't agree with them about some basic things like whether, for example, genocide, is an appropriate term to use, which, you know, was debated and, and decided that it wasn't the right term to use by the ICJ, but then again, quoting some of these same ministers, and seeing some of the, you know, sort of the evidence on the ground saying, but it looks like it's going that direction, right. And so the word genocide, the word apartheid, to describe life in the West Bank, as a, you know, sort of everything that happens inside of Greater Israel that's divided into the West Bank, Israel and Gaza, over which Israel has jurisdiction. And even though we're an occupation, I have found, you know, some people will use it easily and without, you know, without batting an eyelash, and some people say, Well, no, it's not about occupation. Actually, it's disputed. You know, it's disputed territory. So I wonder if you could just reflect out loud on what you think the benefits and also the drawbacks and the harm, are of using some of these words that provokes such an extreme reaction, and over which there is not consensus. And I'm also curious to know whether you use different words depending on the audience you're talking to.

Yeah, I think we disagree a lot on this and that's, that's totally okay. Whatever, use different words depends on the audience, obviously, yes. I mean, you don't want to turn off your audience. So you start carefully. But do I hide my convictions? If I'm asked right away? I'm no. So that's, I will answer honestly. So since I'm asked right away. So the word genocide has been used for so long by the Palestinians to describe the relationship with the Israelis for years. This is not a new phenomenon. has been used by Palestinian activists for so long. But Palestinian who are more scholarly, or people who tried to be more intellectually honest with themselves, and they're not doing the activism, emotional side of things have rejected it, including myself. So for so long, I've said there is no genocide, we cannot talk about genocide. The only thing the closest we've got to a genocide was a 48. And it was a case of ethnic cleansing. Do believe it wasn't a thing when secondary is good literature and evidence to support that. But no, I don't think it was a genocide. As of the start of this war, we've seen an accumulation of evidence that there is a genocide taking place in Gaza. Tremendous amount of evidence that we're able to go to the ICJ and ask, is that a genocide or not. And what the ICJ ruled was, which, by the way, it's not the final rule, because you know, if you, even if you watch Amber, whatever her name, the doctor, the Umbra and agility, court of a divorce or abuse, it took keep them, like few months, or whatever it is. So the idea that you can finish a court case genocided, like two weeks as people further three, just ridiculous, it takes a while. But you find the first like, you know, that sort of like initial ruling or the initial filing, right, and you rule based on it, or what I said is the following, that there is a possible genocide. The second ways that's A and P, that the rule that Israel should take steps to prevent genocide. So maybe there is genocide, this is already a very, very, very, very high threshold, to reach a level of saying there is a possible genocide, it means this one has done something terrible, that the TREACH that from my point of view, I abide by what that decision is saying there is very, very highly, very likely that what happened in Gaza is a genocide. Now why I do not say it's a genocide was certainty because I'm not a legal scholar. But I do use this word because I do think that it's really not actually the radical right wing, the most moderate and introduce unicycle language. President Hertzog Purcell is disgusting. I always say this word genocidal language. And he referred to the children of Gaza refer to everyone, Benjamin Netanyahu, use the disgusting genocidal language generals and the Israeli army distributed papers, cutting the Torah and tonight we're saying we've crushed the children, our children and their scrolls, etc. These are very gentle side of the language. So there are so many evidence to believe that no, now once the ICJ rule, we will see but there are more evidence that the showing that obviously, the starvation etcetera. But again, I'm not a legal scholar to make the certainty but I will switch with iCj now under apartheid question. If I had any doubt, or anyone had any doubt, in his mind, that we are dealing with an apartheid reality in the wiskunde, it should have died, I mean, not should have died, his thought has should have finished in the last year when this new government came on, when all sorts of laws were passed in the Knesset to make the de facto annexation of the West Bank. So it is an apartheid now, that way now has to become between like, Is Israel inherently an apartheid state? So is this conception of 48? Or did it become an apartheid, I tend to believe it became an apartheid, it wasn't inherently important. Thus, Israel can tomorrow, if they decide seems to be an apartheid state, it's as simple as that. In the double legal system that hasn't the West Bank, there are two ways a give the policy interstate, and you you cease to be apartheid, since the double legal system, you harvest in the West Bank, and Gaza to the Palestinians, or the second way to cease to become an apartheid, give everyone citizenship to Palestinians, and create on set reality with equal rights and also cease to be Alberta. Unless these conditions are met. We are dealing with a system of apartheid. Now. I tried to to meet people in the middle I try not to say is there a dishonorable per se there is an apartheid system imposed by Israel on the Palestinian people, meaning that Israel can detach itself from it, choose it and prove me wrong and detach that the what was the third occupation? Obviously, I mean, it's very clear, I think there was consensus, or the Hillsong has this very famous speech called I said, What a scream I know you hate the word kipushi in Hebrew, which means occupation, but it is occupation and we can continue that. If a restaurant can say that, then I mean, what what else do we do we need to prove to you that it's an occupation. I think it's beyond reasonable doubt.

I'll stop Are with the point. I'll do the same order because the order in which we disagree to agree. I don't use the word genocide. And I actually think the ICJ case was interesting, because Palestinians and Israelis both felt like their side one a little bit. So I was like, oh, like they said, it's we're good. And Palestinians were like we got. So I think it was, you know, just another case of Israelis and Palestinians seeing the exact same information and seeing it very differently. It actually that happens a lot you and including, like this week. So I think it's it's an interesting dynamic there. But I and maybe it hits too close to home for me, right, to talk about this. But I, I recognize the horrible language that you mentioned, coming out of Israeli government ministers, frankly, not that all of them control the war. Thankfully, the most extreme ones don't. But even more moderate Israelis in the app in the days following October 7, said horrific things. I think some of them think they were talking only about Hamas and not Gazans. I don't think all of them. And I also don't know if it matters, right, because your words hold a lot of weight when you're in a position of power. And like speaking out of anger, and racism and frustration, and talking of collective punishment in that way, is just not acceptable all the time. And, and again, as I mentioned earlier, I think is really spoke up to the fact that we can't tolerate language like that, or it's going to come back to bite us, which it did at the ICJ case where they had to hear, you know, their own leaders being quoted saying terrible things. And I, again, I unfortunately, think that one of the troubles with wars that and we were discussing this earlier today, that a lot of the things, a lot of them, like sort of investigations take place in the aftermath. So even like counting how many civilians have been killed, things like that aren't 100% accurate until the end? in either direction, could be more Hollywood's might say they're more civilians killed, I would say fewer either way, like you're not, we're not going to have a lot of information, I think there will need to be extremely thorough investigations. I'll certainly speak on the Israeli side, within the IDF at least, and within Israel, with misconduct from soldiers. I have had a lot of discussions with folks in Israel about this. And because it hasn't been happening in the middle of the war, the prosecution's happen afterwards. And I think that's a problem because you have to set an example in the middle of the war, right? Like that's the way you prevent it from continuing to happen. Again, this is where we disagree, because I don't, I don't think it necessarily comes from top down, I think is happening too frequently. But I don't think everything's coming from top down. I think certain things are really the product of the situation, and with the soldiers themselves. When it comes to apartheid here, your question is specifically why we do or don't use particular language. And I think with apartheid, I find it to be a difficult word, because I think often it's used to conflict, people using it or conflating Israel at the West Bank. In the pro Israel camp, and in like the pro Palestine camp, I think there's a conflation. So in the pro Israel camp, folks, we might say to you, how is it apartheid when within Israel proper, we obviously have Palestinian citizens of Israel, who functions essentially, perhaps with discrimination but function as equal citizens? Right. And and I think that's valid. And also I think there's a difference between the West Bank and Israel. One could argue that within the West Bank, it is a national, as opposed to racial or ethnic divide, right, citizens versus non citizens. But again, I don't think it's unreasonable for Palestinians to call it apartheid, particularly when it like in the West Bay is particularly an area see where you have different laws for Jews and for Palestinians, again, a national identity, as opposed to potentially a racial one. But the national identity comes from an ethnic identity as well. So particularly complicated, I do use the word occupation within the West Bank. For similar reasons, I, I feel that it's quite clear to me. And within the context of occupation, and apartheid, and genocide, and war crimes, and all these things, there's a very broad spectrum, right. And I also think two people can think the exact same thing is happening and call it something different. And so I try to be mindful of that when talking to people. And in terms of speaking to different audiences, I definitely code switch a lot, especially moving between different communities. And I think it's important to speak people's language or to do your best I don't, I'm not so good at trying to speak more Palestinians language so I can have more thoughtful conversation with Palestinians, which is hard for me. But I do think it's important to make sure you're doing that to be heard. And I also think it's important to bring nuance into wherever you're speaking wherever you're speaking. And so if you're speaking to a group that's particularly progressive or particularly conservative, you and you're someone like me, who sees themselves as maybe somewhere in the middle of those things, then you're going to want to bring whatever you feel is missing. Imagine that conversation not reinforced what they're already hearing. And so when I frequently find myself in, especially right wing pro Israel spaces, that's my specialty. And it's my own community. And so I often will bring more of what I will, you might call like a pro Palestinian angle, because I feel it's not that you heard it's not present enough. And so it's very important to me. And if I enter more pro Palestinian spaces, I'll try to bring more of a pro Israel framework, because maybe I feel that's what's missing. So I don't think there's anything wrong with doing it. But I'm trying to catch myself a little bit better.

First of all, Hi, everybody, again, I've been so captivated by our panelists, I haven't like looked down and look to you, I want to invite everybody to take a just a breath and sit up a little bit straighter. Because we're going to just shift into audience q&a. I was thinking about, like, how to how to end this part of the conversation on some kind of like a high note, but then I thought, Oh, we're just gonna, like, keep getting down into it. Yeah, we'll do the high note at the end. And so what, what often happens during q&a is, is that the person in my position says to everybody, okay, now everybody, I want you to ask a question. That's a question that has a question mark at the end, right? Don't give a sermon, don't give a statement. We don't want to know what you think we want to know what you want to hear from them. But actually, I want to turn that on its head because like, it's fine. If you have a thought. That's great. If you have a thought, and you're actually just interested in hearing what they think about your thoughts. That's fine. I would just say keep it to a sentence that can have a few commas if you want. But I would say like, keep your thoughts to like one individual thought. And then I'm sure Holyland Shinya would be very happy to reflect on, you know, whatever it is, you're thinking, also, if you have a question, that's fine. That's great. And I think just for the benefit of everybody being able to hear it would actually be great. If people could, like, come over here. Take the mic. Yeah. And then also, this is an opportunity for folks to get to know folks from other parts of the community. So this is Elisa. Great, and you can like, say her sit in the front row. If you've got a question like what you're doing. Thank

you. This is probably for Coolio. I'm just wondering about the foot soldiers and Hezbollah and Hamas. How do they get there they drafted are they volunteers? What? What motivates them? Who are they? Thank you for Great, thanks.

Oh, that's a good question. I'm obviously not the expert on that. But I can tell you I mean, I lived in Gaza. Sorry. I interacted with a lot of Amin. Hamas fighters are our people from our people. I mean, if I was born to a Muslim family, maybe my cousin or my brother could be a Hamas buyer right into part of the community. I mean, I was born to a Christian family, so chances that I have a family member Hamas is in the negative sense. They're Islamist right? Have they been secular? Maybe I would have asked someone so they're just part of the Palestinian community in general. Now. Generally, they tend to be descendants of refugee families. By also virtue that 70% of Gaza are descendants or from February refuges themselves. As we know all the leadership of harass I mean, from Medea seem to Dr. Abdulaziz ROTC to matzah. AKAZA. To said war, all of them came from from 48 different places. They're funny enough, the three of them came from the same city that they came from bachelor. She was in the south today. There's a city called ash calendar. So that's the context. The context is refugee, the the greenness is etc. Now, when they are recruited, and they're recruited, usually, they are recruited through the social movement of Hamas. The social movement that they inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood became Hamas is Islam a social movement. It's a very strong social movement like the rest of the Islamist in the region. And it's a social movement that has a lot of discipline and religiosity as part of it so you don't just take up Hamas if you want to fight I mean, Fatah would accept that during the PLO and the use of right you just have to be Palestinian nationals want to fight you pick a gun, you receive the training and hummus in it religious certain religious disciplines, certain indoctrination, etc. All of that is the process of it. And I do myself I mean, that's more my opinion so it's not objective that it is a radical indoctrination but I think it's a positive thing. I will not say In the teaching of, of war, and there's an understanding of why it's acceptable for the soldiers level is quite radical. And that's something that I think, under military or war or RB orbitons. Should have and in the world, I hope I answered your question. Hezbollah, I don't have expertise on as much, but it's a similar way, but that she is not Sunni. And I think that has this religious elements that have done, done and commerce competitively, but I'm not an expert on Hezbollah by any means.

Hi, thank you both for being here. My one sentence of context, I've been following issues related to settlements since the Lebanon War in 1982. And you're a journalist, and I was I was working in the news business at the time. And as a Jewish journalist, I just found it really disheartening. And it's only gotten worse in the last 42 years. My feelings about it. I'm wondering about each of your perspectives on the role of Israeli settlements over the last 42 years, and what's happening now? Thanks, Jen. Sure,

I'll go first and try to present somewhat of an Israeli perspective on it. I'll start with the fact that I, you know, I feel I feel very connected to the entirety of the Land of Israel, which includes the West Bank, recognize that that there are Jewish holy sites there. And sometimes I say, like, if I could swap the West thing for the rest of Israel and take the West Bank as a progressive Israel, I would, because that's like, in some ways, the biblical heartland of the population transfer. I don't know, how people feel about that one. But with regards to settlements, I mean, I think there's been a massive obstruction. And it's interesting, because I think Israelis feel like it's not a big deal. Like, obviously, we've approved settlements before we did it in Gaza did in the north. I mean, it's something we've done before. So don't Palestinians know that? Of course, we'll we'll do it again. If there's, if there's a negotiation on the table, we'll do it again. Right. That is not how Palestinians see it, rightfully. So they see it as you just agreed that this land is going to be a future state for us. And then you're putting your own people on it, right? Obviously, that's typically that in many ways, it's obstructing daily life for Palestinians already living there because now that even checkpoint to go from their own between two of their own cities. Right. So it's it's massively affecting them that others in tennis IDF presence, to protect the Israelis that are living there, which would not be necessary otherwise, right? So many ways in which it disrupts Palestinian life, just deeply, deeply troubling to me. And, I mean, that's, as I'm sure you know, how you feel. Similarly, I think it's a massive obstruction. But I think it's interesting to think about how it's rarely see it as what's the big deal. Of course, we can afford to supplement versus what do you mean, like you're building on land that's supposed to be ours? Did you even agree like that? We're in the middle of a negotiation right now, right.

Yeah. I honestly understand the deep religious connection to the West Bank that Shani has mentioned for the Jewish people. But I always tell people that what is scary about it is that there is also a deep religious connection to Jordan. And there is deep religious connection coming for them. Yeah, exactly. Syria, and I was like, actually, I made the jump to the Jordanians all the time when they go to Mount Aleppo. Aleppo is called what is called Mount Sumatra where Moses steps toward basically Jordan they know exactly people when they go there every time I go there I told them one day you will have a settler radical settlers coming I'm telling you this is ours. Because if you think you'll find some more stuff, and they will take it I mean, that's exactly what's what's what's happening in those when did they get well Sheila was in the timber Morocco. And I think the name is timber McElroy. So yeah, so it's here, right? We have to get Chilo now Oh, David walked from here. Oh, rachel, such here that these are the names the Westbrook right. Rachel sat here, David worked from there. So it's always so a similar mental mill can apply to Jurica apply to look around, etc. With us. We cannot accept by any means that religious connection to a place equals of reality. This is a myth. Thus, if the West Bank is not part of Israel, and Israel occupied it, and people are moving to the West Bank and living there, this has a very this word has a very meaningful description, not description. There is a definition for this word, and it's colorization. So we call it the words they're not actually I no longer use the word settlers or settlements. and work colonies. That's what I call them. That's interesting because it's coming from a Palestinian, whose first interaction to Israelis was the settlers, I spent more time in settlements, talking to settlers as a Palestinian, ironically, that I spent talking to people in Tel Aviv, and I understand completely, their feeling and the religious connection, etc. But I don't accept it. Matter of fact, I was actually prescribing to actual to Peter to Peterborough, my friend I was describing to him that the closest you can get to some of those messianic thinking within hummus is the settlers, they're actually very much. They're very similar. The settlers and the fighters who entered on October Summit, think in a similar way. Obviously, there's differences in many ways, but it's a really dangerous phenomenon. Unfortunately, they're really the lobby of the settlements is very strong in Israel. And it's currently that the lobby of the settlements are getting stronger here among the Republican Party, and it's really a disaster. Can

you actually say more about that mirror image? Can you say like, describe what it is in America.

So I think one element of certain elements within Hamas is military wing is uplifted and messianic in its nature in the sense that they believe and what so called the middle of the last day by Rachael Asha, and the way that they believe there are certain prophecy I'm totally fulfilled on this prophecy is the end of Israel through a bottle of fire, etc. And the prophecy was that it will happen in 2022. This wouldn't be the end of the service. Notice, a lot of them believed in it from the fighters. And obviously, it came one year later, it seems like 23 because that's what's safe another thoughts when it's a very similar thing to the thinking of the Messianic settlers there because they believe in that diary of the rose Rashleigh, the Greater Israel who will have fire bottle and external so they're very, very much similarity in them in the sense that it's a promise from God, there is a prophecy, we have to fulfill it being here is very much a holy, righteous mission, etc. They're very, very much similar. How

does Christian Messianism fit into this as as a as a Christian and also, you know, sort of like what I'm talking about,

you're obviously a by tradition and Orthodox Church. Although I'm like, I mean, I'm an orthodox but I've spent a lot of time on Buddhist import because I studied theology and Protestant institution in Bethlehem and Orthodox work we don't have any of that it's a former libertarian the US there's a lot of Christian Messianism I think their similarity with with with with the settlers movement, like the DOS, messianic sort of thinking and the Christian evangelicals here, is very much similar to the civil rights movement, except that the end goal is different. Like the simpler scent, the Messiah will come back after the establishment or whatever, and everyone will be submissive to them. The Christians think that all these Jews, most of them will be killed them in some sort of a kingdom will be established and the Jews will convert right. But they intersect. I mean, a lot of these settlements are founded by by Christian evangelicals have been walked over the hill and you will go to this big building and it has the picture of our very own job at Texas, this pastor of director of Kufa, really big guy and he has really thick, deep accent accent. It's in the middle of a real funny Christian pastor. No, no that was he funded this obviously.

Thank you. Man gal. Oh,

I'll just say that we didn't we didn't talk about, you know, major settlement blocks versus smaller outposts. But there is a role that land swaps are very likely to play in an eventual to state outcome. That is something that Palestinian leadership has acknowledged. It's something the Arab Peace Initiative has acknowledged it's certainly something Israelis assume, and actually think it's a problem not to speak about it because Israelis think not I don't want to speak with a secret with a broad brush when some Israelis hear uprooting settlements, they think uprooting my enemies and like very large towns, which are not, despite Yes, you know, originally being still being obstructions to Palestinian state, they are at this point considered consensus within Israeli society, with many, many people there with many 10s of dozens of 1000s. And so I just want to name that that's not what I'm thinking of when I think you know, 2024 of being obstructions anymore. And so I feel like it's important to name and I think that distinction will help Israelis get a lot closer to understanding, like what needs to happen and what doesn't because I think people can get very defensive when they think, Wait, what about my ledger, meme or Bucha? See on where like my cousin lives? Right. And so making sure people realize that that's not likely on the table for being evacuated and that Palestinians, certainly the leadership level, know that.

So I have had a question I want to put to the both of you. First, I want to just say, I'm really grateful that you are coming into spaces like this and doing this. So you mentioned that you've done this together a number of times. Um, so first of all, my question is not policy, what and you mentioned that you come to spaces together, and there's clearly an ease between the two of you, in speaking to us, at least that I pick up on. And so it's also clear to me that you have conversations outside of these spaces, private conversations I'm imagining. So I'm wondering, your process of dialoguing just along with one another. I'm wondering, do you find more commonality or less commonality than maybe you would have expected to? And I'm wondering is, is it the kind of thing where you're thinking to yourselves? Well, if they just leave, you know, SHINee, and Kelly on charge will have this, you know, we'll have this figured out next week. And I realized, I mean, that's I'm not trying to be glib, and that's pretty, you know, fantastical, but I'm just kind of wondering about the two of you having these conversations with yourselves, not even in front of a group, or what that process has been like for the two of you. Does that make sense? And whether you found more commonality than you would have expected to or less than you would have expected to or just what that's been like.

So I think what's most important, we didn't get to this yet. But we have a very similar shared vision of the future, which makes it a lot easier to argue about past and even the present. So I think we have very different, you know, perceptions of who's we think mostly everyone is wrong, but who's more wrong? Sometimes, right? Who was worse and X situation who's most at fault? Who's most likely to fix it? That maybe we agree on. But it makes it a lot easier when ultimately, once you I will say prevail, we ultimately come to the conclusion that the compromise in the form of a two state outcome is the only possible like realistic vision for the future. And we agree on not every path to get there. But let's say half of them. Right. And so we can talk about that. And I think that if we had very different visions of the endgame, these conversations would be, I can say very hard for me, probably very hard for Julio, if I had a different vision for the NBA, but because we are aligned in what the end goal is, it's a lot easier to argue about what's happening right now. And who's right and who's wrong? Because of that, at least for me.

Yeah, I think I mean, I agree. I think like one element that makes it easier for SHINee. And I think it's, it's the humans that actually has rationality and logic. I mean, if you have these three things, I think together makes the conversation way easier. When when the conversation is much more superstitious, it's harder for me to be to be engaged. Because, like, I tried to approach things logically, because from our perspective, things should be so logically, and obviously, the humans etc. Now, obviously, it's easy. It's not, it's not easy, as she said, it's hard. And sometimes, like today, we're talking about, like, stuff that has to do with numbers and casualties and like, my mind was, like, boiling and that she's even asking that, to me is like, Are you freaking serious? Like you really think like, we're making up our death or something, you know, I know, but in my mind, you know, it's my blood sugar. I know for sure. Like, it's hard. I know. It's like we've come from, she comes from a tradition where you can trust the idea of, I come from an experience where these are the last people you should trust. That's, that's a deep, deep, deep division. Now, I would even push a little bit farther for my training said that yes, we we are it's much easier for us to be together because we both believe in two state solution, whatever. But I would push to say it's also easy to talk to those who believe in one state solution. If they are approaching from a humanist perspective. Those who believe in equal rights, they also believe for equal for equality and dignity for everyone, not a one Superior National group to the other. I think I would work with them. I would welcome them with the Palestinians or Israelis as well. I believe in a two state solution, not because it's the ideal or it's the best or it's the most trusted because it's the most practical one. If at some point it became not practical from my point of view, I would switch in a glimpse for an AI to any other alternative.

Have you ever felt close to it have been practical?

I mean, obviously now, but obviously with the coming of this Israeli government that it seems impossible, and unpractical, I think one can think of other of other means that just that every time there is violence and there is trauma, I think the idea that we can just trust each other over a minute seems harder. And the two state solution is the most pessimistic, by the way. It's pessimistic in the sense that you don't have to trust the other doc much. Although the Israelis keep talking about that, oh, we're scared fortessa solution, whatever. I mean, I told him, that's the least actually, you have to worry about I mean, if you look at it, that when you look at the Egyptian deal, or that's the Jordanian deal, there were no really any incidents of borders are quite clear and controlled. So they shouldn't be worried as worried about that. Maybe they should be worried about the other alternative, which is the apartheid situation that we are at, because guess what, violence will not go away? You cannot suppress people and suspend their rights and expect them to throw floors. And that's unfortunate reality. Do I like it? No, but this is human nature. And that will, unfortunately be there.

Can I answer the following question, too? Because

I picked the follow up question. The

follow up question was, if think Tuesday's is, is realistic or close in any way, I will not guarantee that it's close. I think it's inevitable, eventually, because I clearly just said, I think the current situation is completely untenable. I think that on the Israeli side, what would make them feel most secure is, in their words would be something similar to the current situation, but essentially controlling the entirety of the land that doesn't last forever, that ends eventually, there is no world in which 100 years from now we're in the same situation we are in now, it will either have been fixed, or it will be worse, right. And so I don't see that vision, which means that you're gonna need to bring Israelis who are in the position of power, as close as you can to something Palestinians will work with. And that's where two states is, right. And I think I recognize there are a lot more grievances between the two. But I tried to remind myself and others that Egypt and Jordan are in some, some pretty terrible wars with Israel. And their people do not love each other. But they managed to be neighbors and coordinate and security and share intelligence and share our border relatively peacefully for quite a long time now. And with Egypt, that was only a couple of years after a war in which from my perspective, Egypt was trying to, quote unquote, wipe Israel off the map. You know, and, and we've, we've had a degree with them that even lasted throughout a change in government there. And so I'm relatively optimistic, it will be much harder, the Palestinians will remind you, Jordan has quite a lot of Palestinians living there, including their own queen, and still managed to have a very good relationship. So I don't think there's something inherent here. I sometimes get troubled when people talk about the Israeli Palestinian conflict as if it's been ongoing for 1000 years, which is not true, and also makes it feel like it is impossible to solve. And yes, it is, even from like an objective standpoint, or one of the hardest conflicts to solve. And, and also will eventually be solved somehow, I just hope there isn't too much bloodshed before that happens.

Let's do a lightning round here with Alex and brewery, you can just ask, like, ask her a question and ask your question. And then they'll Yeah, great.

Hi. Thanks, again for being here. Okay, um, okay. So one of the issues that I always have that in my family always has been dealing with this conflict is the idea of like, everyone seems to be so focused on Israel in the world when there are conflicts happening all over the world. And is it anti semitic to be so focused on what's going on in Israel, when, for some reason, the zeitgeist in America has not really glommed on to what's going on in Haiti or the Congo or Sudan or things like that. So I guess, is it well, I don't want to say like, is it? I guess my question is sort of twofold. Sorry, for the lightning round. But why do you think this has become such a central issue for Americans and especially young Americans in this country to be dealing with what's happening in Israel, especially for non Jewish Americans to be involving themselves in this issue? And then on the other hand, um, is it the sole responsibility of Israel, who by all accounts, has created a humanitarian crisis in Gaza to solve that humanitarian crisis? When there Are other countries in the area? Who I guess if Netanyahu is not going to solve it, then he's not going to solve it. So should we be putting pressure on other countries? Egypt, Jordan, whoever and say, You guys are also there, like you saw that you do something here? Or are they doing stuff? And I just don't know. Great.

Thank you.

Thank you for being here tonight. My question is sort of pertains more to what happened like, before October 7, it seemed to me that there was sort of a normalization between Israel and some Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, and other states and just Arab states in general. And so I'm just wondering, maybe if I get both your takes on what do you think that at all had an impact or influence in Hamas his decision to fulfill October 7, because they're worried about this normalization process occurring? Thank you.

Basically, three really different questions.

I mean, to all of them, but I feel like, yeah, yeah, sure. Yeah. To start with

Saudi Arabia, I don't think it was a factor. I mean, actually, talking to the Saudi officials and people who are close to the Crown Prince, etc. The alternate was a mess. We were not close to it, we were far from it. The only way through which they could have normalized obviously, they wanted a Palestinian state, or at least a huge concession. And that which they know they can get it from Bibi. The second thing, they wanted the nuclear power, which means actually, it's, it's ahead to something bigger, they want to develop something else with the nuclear power, you know, so it's a very peaceful, so they wanted something else. And this is a red line for the security establishment in the US. So it was not going there. Now, the two people, the two types of people who believe that the peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia was over there, and almost there, etc, super pro Israel, people and think tanks who are pro stress, etc. Interest Group who are committed to Israel, and the second are people who are close to Iran, the proxies of Iran, these levers are interested to show that we're very important and the Arabs want us and you can just forget about the Palestinians, the Saudis like us, so who cares? And the Iranians because they want the Saudis to look bad. And if you want to make someone looks bad in the Arab world, and the Muslim world, make them that they're friends with Israel, and they will look bad. That's that's the reality of it, obviously, when when they ignored the Palestinian question as well. So the reality is they were back to or not close. And it just that wasn't a big factor on Hamas has calculation. Now, even if it wasn't it still, if it was close, if it was, let's assume, but I don't think it was. It's impossible right now. That's all it is. I think. Prince Turki, two days ago, just say the very, very harsh words about Israel and say that the idea that I personally was talking to one of the royal family members just few weeks ago, and he said the other day that any of us would shake hands with with BB is this possible? I mean, for someone else, maybe not with BP, it's just out of out of out of the thinking.

So we'll do now we'll go backwards. So in terms of Egypt and Jordan, other countries, I will say from a from a legal perspective, it is Israel's responsibility. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is Israel's responsibility. It doesn't mean that it's all their fault that we got here. Obviously, Hamas plays a role. Certainly, and and obviously, there is a border with Egypt, etc. But Israel is currently essentially governing the Gaza Strip in some ways. Right. And, and the people I speak to with, with Israel, have a clear understanding of that, frankly. So I think it's objectively their responsibility. It doesn't mean that other parties won't be involved in the art of the Emiratis have been very involved in sending aid. And Jordan, as our has said, if you include the Palestinian Authority, I mean, Jordan also ascended and has said, you know, if you're willing to include the Palestinian Authority in your endgame, we will send police officers right to help. So I think that first of all, if Israel includes and makes it, notably will include the Palestinian Authority, there will be a lot more support, right from the Saudis and Emiratis, from everyone wants to, I think all of these Arab countries want to fix this problem and recognize that they there is a role they can play, and that's important in the rehabilitation of Gaza, but they're not going to do it, if they're perceived or actually, in effect are just supporting an Israeli occupation of Gaza. So I think they're going to need something but I think that some of them are stepping up. I don't have like entirely just just criticism for them. They've played a role in this mess too, but I don't see them as not not supporting the cause to Semitism.

Like why Why is everybody so obsessed with Israel all the time very

sexy conflicts. I really mean that I I think it is I think that it's the Holy Land, which is very exciting for people. Everyone's very invested. Everyone has some skin in the game. I think that I do think anti semitism plays a role. Even if it's not over, there's this, this idea that the Jews, the historically oppressed, people coming out of the Holocaust are now dominating over another people in the middle of the Middle East surrounded by Arabs, there's something very, I hate to say the word appealing to people about that type of conflict, but they're interested in Jews versus the Muslims. Right. It's a very exciting for people. I know, it sounds, you know, with the Christians involved as everybody's involved. And so I do think that part of it is people just find it intriguing, interesting, maybe, and there's like a feel of Semitism there too, not always like an inherent anti semitism feel separatism, something weird. Islamophobia plays a role to on the right and people's interest in I think they're people see their own conflicts and their own identities playing out there. Because there are so many identities playing out there that you can find yourself in it. Right. And so certainly Christians, Jews and Muslims, and Arabs can all find themselves in this conflict that's already like half the world. So So I think that certainly plays a robot. And I think Palestinians are very effectively build a lot build alliances, across progressive causes the United States, I think they've done like a really, by their standards, you know, like a really good job of building that. And cuttery money.